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Abstract
In the proposed paper, an attempt is made to estimate the proportion of unstated income 
for Russian households based on micro data. An overview of microeconomic approaches 
to estimating the scale of under-reported income is provided. These approaches are weakly 
represented in the national literature, so their strengths and weaknesses are also analyzed. 
A theoretical model of household consumer behavior is described that allows the size of 
under-reported income to be estimated. The structure of household incomes and expendi-
tures is studied based on an RLMS sample for 2012. The model is estimated using house-
hold subsamples based on the type of household and household income. The estimation 
technique utilizes regression variables and random effects. The resulting subsample esti-
mates were applied to the general population and compared with those obtained by other 
researchers using alternative methods and other data. A comparison is made to estimates 
of under-reported income developed for British households.
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
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.H\ZRUGV under-reported household income, household consumer behavior, under-reported 
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1. Introduction
Under-reported income for households is one side of the shadow economy, 
ZKRVHGH¿QLWLRQLQFOXGHVWKRVHHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHLQFRPHGHULYHGIURP
them that circumvent or otherwise avoid government regulation, taxation or ob-
VHUYDWLRQ'HO¶$QQR$OWKRXJK WKHVHDFWLYLWLHVDUHXQUHODWHG WR WKHSUR-
duction of criminal goods and services, they are conducted in a clandestine man-
ner and remain outside of the social and pension security system. The shadow 
  &RUUHVSRQGLQJDXWKRUE-mail address: taratnikova@yandex.ru. 
  3HHUUHYLHZXQGHUUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL
doi line 
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2016.04.004
57<D0XUDVKRY75DWQLNRYD5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
economy includes covert production, income and expenses for end consumption 
and accumulation that are hidden from the statistics.
Typically, the size of the shadow economy is assessed in proportion to the gross 
GRPHVWLFSURGXFW&RQYHQWLRQDOZLVGRPVD\VWKDWLQGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVLWGRHV
QRWH[FHHGWRRI*'3LQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVLWFDQUHDFKWR
DQGLQWUDQVLWLRQHFRQRPLHVLWDFFRXQWVIRUWRRI*'3%XURY
In modern Russia — where, according to survey by the World Bank, 2012, half 
RIWKH*'3LVSURGXFHGLQWKHLQIRUPDOVHFWRU²WKHSUHYDLOLQJVKDGRZHFRQRP\
is a particularly acute problem. In addition to adversely affecting the sociopoliti-
cal and economic life of the country, this phenomenon also undermines its inter-
national reputation. 
The majority of Russian and foreign research papers on the shadow economy 
address the macroeconomic level, revealing that part of the economy — mea-
VXUHGDVDVKDUHRIWKH*'3²WKDWLVKLGGHQIURPWD[HV7KHPHWKRGVIRUHYDOX-
ating the size of the shadow economy are based on certain macroeconomic in-
dicators linked to the amount of goods and services produced within the coun-
WU\0DFURHFRQRPLVWVKDYHDZLGHDUUD\RIRI¿FLDOO\SXEOLVKHGVWDWLVWLFDOGDWDDW
WKHLUGLVSRVDODQGWKH\XWLOL]HDQH[WHQVLYHVHWRIWKHRUHWLFDOPHWKRGV+RZHYHU
the aggregate nature of macroeconomic data, while revealing the big picture, 
does not take into account the heterogeneity of contributions made by different 
social groups to the shadow economy, thus impeding the development of targeted 
measures that could pull household activities out from the shadows. 
The alternative approach studies microeconomic data obtained from house-
hold budget surveys. It determines the size of the shadow economy based on 
the estimated share of income hidden by households. Unlike macroeconomics, 
the microeconomic approach provides access to the individual characteristics of 
surveyed subjects and analyzes the particular aspects of their consumer behavior. 
The advantage of this approach is that it is not linked to the direct accounting of 
tax revenues paid by households, thereby potentially enabling a more realistic 
estimate of the size of the shadow economy. Sample surveys to assess the shadow 
economy are used in many countries. The inconvenience of these methods is as-
sociated with the standard defects in all surveys. The results largely depend on 
WKHZLOOLQJQHVVRIUHVSRQGHQWVWRFRRSHUDWHKRZHYHUWKHPDMRULW\RIUHVSRQGHQWV
are reluctant to acknowledge fraudulent behavior, and thus, their responses are of 
TXHVWLRQDEOHUHOLDELOLW\2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶FRRSHUDWLRQLVQRW
for issues related to their sources of income and spending on major purchases). 
Another disadvantage is that surveys cannot cover all clandestine activities and 
all income groups (respondents from high-income segments of the population 
who have the largest proportion of concealed revenue are not available for in-
terviews). For these reasons, this approach always produces an underestimation. 
$V UHVHDUFK IRU WKH2(&' FRXQWULHV .LULHQNR DQG ,YDQRY  VKRZV
the highest estimates of the shadow economy are yielded by monetary methods 
(demand for cash, volume of transactions in the economy, and the ratio between 
cash and deposits). Additionally, there are the tax gap methods (measuring the dis-
crepancy between declared income and income after inspection), with the lowest 
estimates obtained in the analysis of sample population surveys. Table 1 illus-
trates the gap in the estimated scale of the shadow economy in Russia, as ob-
tained by different methods in different years.
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The estimates obtained from an analysis of microdata about concealed house-
KROGLQFRPHDUHVFDUFHLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHDVWKHUHDUHQRVXI¿FLHQWO\GHYHORSHGV\V-
tematic approaches to adequately replicate these estimates for the entire population.
+RZHYHUWRPDNHHIIHFWLYHGHFLVLRQVRQUHJXODWRU\PHDVXUHVLWLVLPSRUWDQW
not only to know the estimated size of concealed income across the country as 
a whole but also to know in more detail which population groups are more in-
clined to use those practices. The micro-analysis enables a more objective ap-
proach to medium- and low-income segments of the population, the data on 
ZKLFKUHÀHFWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHQDWLRQDOKRXVHKROGEXGJHWVXUYH\V
The relevance of surveys of concealed household income in lower income 
groups may be associated with an analysis of the changes in prices for goods con-
sumed by certain groups of households, which may serve as a basis for estimating 
the effects of price policies. For example, Ershov and Matitsin (2012) show that 
LQÀDWLRQLVPXFKKLJKHUIRUWKHSRRUWKDQIRUWKHULFK7KXVLWLVSRVVLEOHWRDV-
sume that escaping to the shadow is one of the few ways available to poor house-
KROGVWRFRPSHQVDWHIRULQÀDWLRQFRVWVLQWKHVKRUWWHUPDQGWKHUHIRUHLVDPHWKRG
of survival. The modeling of concealed income for various socio- demographic 
groups can become a basis for understanding what groups, and to what extent, may 
be pushed into the shadow by increasing prices for vital commodities.
The study aims to contribute to the modeling of concealed income for low- 
and medium-income population groups within Russia. It provides an estimate of 
the share of concealed income for various Russian socio-demographic groups 
covered by RLMS statistics, using an approach that takes the consumer behav-
ior of households into account. This analysis will be based on the consumption 
model of certain vital goods as a function of unobserved income, the indirect 
information about which can be obtained from declared income. The methodol-
ogy for obtaining estimates of under-reported income parameters will be de-
rived from a number of hypotheses about the distinctive features of consumer 
behavior for self-employed and hired workers. Using econometric analysis, we 
will obtain interval-based estimates of the under-reported income parameters for 
selected groups of households and, based on these estimates, calculate intervals 
for the proportion of concealed income for each group. To compare these esti-
Table 1
(VWLPDWHGVL]HRIWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\LQ5XVVLDRI*'3
Year 'DWDVRXUFH Size of the shadow 
economy
 0/DFNR¶VFDOFXODWLRQXVLQJWKHHOHFWULFLW\FRVWPHWKRG 
 5HSRUWE\&KHUQRP\UGLQWRWKH5XVVLDQ0LQLVWU\RI,QWHUQDO$IIDLUV 50
 Estimate by the Goskomstat of Russia based on SNA data 22
 6FKQHLGHU¶VFDOFXODWLRQXVLQJWKHFDVKGHPDQGPHWKRG 42
2000 2I¿FLDOGDWDIURPWKH0DLQ(FRQRPLF&ULPHV'HSDUWPHQWRI
the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs
40
 96RSWDJDQRYVHFUHWDU\RIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLORI
WKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ93DQVNRYDXGLWRURIWKH$XGLW&KDPEHU
25
 World Bank experts 40
2011 9=KXNRYVN\VHQLRUDQDO\]W5LNRP7UXVWLQYHVWPHQWFRPSDQ\ ±
2011 Rosstat 15
6RXUFHV.LULHQNRDQG,YDQRY$XWKRUV¶FRPSLODWLRQRIGDWDIURPRI¿FLDOVWDWLVWLFV ODZHQIRUFHPHQW
DJHQFLHVVFLHQWL¿FSXEOLFDWLRQVDQGHVWLPDWHVE\RI¿FLDOV
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mates with those of macro approaches, we will extrapolate the results by using 
the information provided by Rosstat on the distribution of income of the general 
population.
2. Review of the literature
6HULRXVVFLHQWL¿FVWXGLHVRQWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\RQO\VWDUWHGWRDSSHDUGXULQJ
WKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHWKFHQWXU\*%HFNHU3*XWPDQQ(6XWKHUODQG+GH
6RWR( )HLJH DQG.+DUW HWF FDQ EH FRQVLGHUHG WKHIRXQGHUV RI WKLV NLQG
of analysis. They created the conceptual apparatus, investigated the nature of 
the shadow economy, and developed a methodology for its analysis (Burov and 
6DPDUXNKD$WWKHVDPHWLPHLQWKH8665**URVVPDQ$.DOLEHUGD
7.RU\DJLQD'.DXIPDQQDQG'6FKQHLGHUFRQGXFWHGVWXGLHVWRSURYHWKHH[-
istence of the shadow economy as part of the plan-based socialist economic sys-
WHP$VLJQL¿FDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWDOLVVXHVRIWKHKLGGHQHFRQRP\
ZDVPDGHE\'0DNDURY$3RQRPDUHQNR%,VSUDYQLNRYDQG$2OHLQLNZKR
explored the phenomenon of the shadow economy in Russia at the end of the 20th 
FHQWXU\DQGLGHQWL¿HGLWVYDULRXVVHFWRUVVKDGRZLQIRUPDOFRQFHDOHG LOOHJDO
EODFNHWF7KHZRUNVE\/.RVDOVVWXGLHGWKHRULJLQVRIWKHVKDGRZVWUXFWXUHV
DQGLQVWLWXWLRQVRIWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\97DPERYWVHY95DGDHY60DODNKRY
and A. Oleinik analyzed the impact of transaction costs in the Russian economy 
on the proliferation of shadow practices.  Radaev studied the prevalence of vio-
OHQFH LQ WKHVKDGRZ HFRQRP\ 3RQRPDUHQNR  DQDO\]HG WKHVWUXFWXUH RI
the shadow economy and suggested the following main sectors: the production 
VHFWRULOOHJDOHFRQRP\WKHVHFWRUSURYLGLQJDUHDOFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH*'3DQG
the redistribution sector of the shadow economy, which includes various crimes.
The objective of many studies was to identify the causes behind the emer-
gence of the shadow econo my. &DVVHODQG&LFK\FRQFOXGHWKDWUHJDUGOHVV
of differences among national socioeconomic systems, the economic causes of 
the shadow economy are rooted in the economic role of the state, especially in 
regulating distribution relationships. In the West the primary role is played by 
LQFUHDVHGWD[SUHVVXUHZKLOHLQWKH(DVWLWLVGULYHQE\LQÀDWLRQ
Among the social causes of the shadow economy, one of the main recognized 
causes is the gap between the standard of living of the majority of the popula-
tion and that of the middle class. Inequality in wealth and social status determine 
the number of potential participants in the shadow economy. The shadow econo-
my is largely represented by the poor and marginalizes strata: youth, the unem-
ployed, migrant workers, etc. In terms of raw numbers, they make up the greatest 
portion of participants in the shadow economy (Popov and Tarasov, 2005).
The imperfection of laws is the legal reason for the shadow sector of the econ-
omy to persist. The legislative framework fails to react quickly to the rapidly 
changing environment of a market economy, with gaps occurring in the legal 
¿HOG WKDW FUHDWH IDYRUDEOH FRQGLWLRQV IRU WKHVKDGRZ HFRQRP\ %XURY DQG
Samarukha, 2010). 
The political reasons researchers refer to include the merger of power and ma-
jor capital, which produces an oligarchy. By lobbying their oligarchic interests, 
ODUJHEXVLQHVVHVSODFHVPDOOFRPSDQLHVLQSRRUFRQGLWLRQVDQG³SXVK´WKHPLQWR
the shadow. 
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Finally, there is the desire to receive more with less effort. This kind of ratio-
nale, in the absence or weakness of restrictions, encourages people to engage in 
shady activities (Burov and Samarukha, 2010).
7KHIRFXVRI DQXPEHURISDSHUVZDV WR¿QGDQVZHUV WR WKHTXHVWLRQ, what 
are the dangers of the shadow economy? There are multiple negative effects on 
society from the shadow economy (Timchenko, 2004):
x QHJDWLYH LPSDFWVRQEXGJHWV DW DOO OHYHOV DQG DV D UHVXOW OLPLWHG¿QDQFLQJ
WRSHUIRUPWKHVWDWH¶VIXQFWLRQVVXFKDVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQGHIHQVHIXQGDPHQWDO
VFLHQFHKHDOWKFDUHDQGVRFLDOSURJUDPV
x QHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHHI¿ciency of macroeconomic policies, because the of - 
¿FLDOVWDWLVWLFVQHHGHGIRUPDFURHFRQRPLFGHFLVLRQPDNLQJEHFRPHGLVWRUW-
ed and prevent timely informed decisions to encourage development in an 
economic sector, which results in the biased development of particular in-
GXVWULHV
x negative impact on economic growth and development of the legal sector, be-
cause the ability to purchase goods and services in the shadow sector reduces 
WKHQHHGIRUJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVSURGXFHGOHJDOO\
x lack of investment in the legal economy due to lower earnings and decreased 
competitiveness, as enterprises in the formal sector of the economy are ini-
tially at a disadvantage in economic terms compared with enterprises in the in-
IRUPDOHFRQRP\EHFDXVHRIWKHKLJKWD[EXUGHQ
x negative impact on the conditions for reproducing labor in the legal econ-
omy, because failure to pay taxes in the informal sector enables enterprises 
in the shadow economy to allocate more funds to pay under-reported wages, 
WKHUHE\FUHDWLQJEHWWHU¿QDQFLDORSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUHQJDJLQJVNLOOHGODERUZLWK-
RXWZRUU\LQJDERXWLWVUHSURGXFWLRQ
x uncontrollable consequences for the environment due to the inability to for-
mally record these harmful consequences and due to the avoidance of pay-
PHQWVIRUXVLQJQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQG¿QHVIRUHQYLURQPHQWDOSROOXWLRQ
x negative effect on foreign investment, due to the unwillingness of foreign in-
vestors to work with inadequate economic and legal conditions in the criminal 
HQYLURQPHQW
x GHIRUPDWLRQ RI WKHFRQVXPSWLRQ VWUXFWXUH GXH WR DOORFDWLQJ FDVK ÀRZ LQ
WKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\SUHGRPLQDQWO\LQDUHDVZKHUHRQHFDQHDUQKLJKSUR¿WV
over a short period of time at minimal cost, due to the lack of governmental 
FRQWURODQGWROHJLVODWLYHJDSV
x creation of conditions that encourage the growth of corruption in society, along 
with the criminal economy, organized crime, and terrorism.
+RZHYHUWKHUHLVDQDOWHUQDWLYHYLHZWKDWDUJXHVWKDWVRPHNLQGVRIVKDGRZ
economies (especially the informal) actually support the development of the for-
PDOHFRQRP\UDWKHUWKDQKLQGHULW$FFRUGLQJWR&DVVHODQG&LFK\WKHUH
are three positive functions of the shadow economy in a market economy:
x ³HFRQRPLFOXEULFDQW´LHVPRRWKLQJRIÀXFWXDWLRQVLQWKHHFRQRPLFHQYLURQ-
ment by redistributing resources between the legal and the shadow economy 
(during a crisis, the production resources of the legal economy are redistrib-
XWHGWRWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\DQGUHWXUQDIWHUWKHFULVLV
x ³VRFLDOVKRFNDEVRUEHU´LHWKHPLWLJDWLRQRIVRFLDOLQHTXDOLW\LQIRUPDOHP-
SOR\PHQWLPSURYHV¿QDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHSRRU
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x ³EXLOWLQVWDELOL]HU´LHUHVRXUFHVLQWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\WKDWIXHOWKHOHJDO
economy (concealed income is used to purchase goods and services in the le-
JDOVHFWRU³ODXQGHUHG´LOOLFLWFDSLWDOLVWD[HGHWF
The answers to most questions of interest to researchers are closely related to 
measuring the scale of the shadow economy.
The effectiveness of such measurements is greatly limited by the very nature 
RIWKHSKHQRPHQRQZKLFKLVQRWFRYHUHGE\RI¿FLDOVWDWLVWLFV7KHTXDQWLWDWLYH
estimation methods for shadow economy parameters rely on data from reports 
by relevant ministries, agencies and organizations, and on sample surveys of en-
WHUSULVHV DQG KRXVHKROGV'HSHQGLQJRQ WKHW\SH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ VRXUFHV XVHG
the approaches are divided into two groups: indirect (macroeconomic) and direct 
PLFURHFRQRPLF'LUHFWPHWKRGV WHQG WRXQGHUHVWLPDWH WKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\
indirect methods usually overestimate it.
The majority of analytical tools are macroeconomic, among which are a number 
of monetary approaches associated with cash demand or associated with alternative 
FDOFXODWLRQVRIWKH*'3%DUVXNRYD7KHUHDUHDOVRSRSXODUPHWKRGVIRUHVWL-
mating the size of the shadow economy based on electricity consumption and the di-
YHUJHQFHEHWZHHQWKHRI¿FLDODQGUHDOODERUPDUNHW,WDOLDQPHWKRG7KHFRPSDUD-
bility of results is the main advantage of macroeconomic methods (Burov, 2012). 
The number of microeconomic tools for analyzing the shadow economy is 
much smaller. Two primary areas of microeconomic estimates are being devel-
RSHGWRGHWHUPLQHWKHVL]HRIWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\%DUVXNRYDWKH¿UVW
explores the discrepancy between overall household income and expenditures, 
while the second examines the divergence between the consumption of certain 
VSHFL¿FJRRGVE\KLUHGDQGVHOIHPSOR\HGKRXVHKROGV
7KH¿UVWJURXSRIPRGHOVDQDO\]HWKHGLYHUJHQFHEHWZHHQLQFRPHDQGH[SHQ-
ditures, and the key conclusion is that the core of the shadow economy is self-
HPSOR\HGKRXVHKROGV7KLV¿QGLQJEHFRPHVWKHPDLQK\SRWKHVLVIRUWKHPRGHOV
in the second group, which compare the ratios of income and expenditures for cer-
tain categories of goods and services between self-employed and hired workers. 
The second hypothesis of these models is that employees correctly report their 
wages, while the self-employed hide their income. The third premise of the mod-
els is that households correctly declare expenditures on current consumer goods.
The last two hypotheses can be considered a bottleneck of the model that com-
pares the expenses of self-employed households and others. Suvorov (2008) notes 
that in certain sectors of the Russian economy there is an established practice of 
³VKDGRZ´ZDJHV7KLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\WUXHIRUWKHWUDGHDQG¿QDQFHVHFWRUV,QWKLV
FDVHZDJHVDUHVWDWHGLQFRUUHFWO\DVZLWKLQFRPH+HDOVRQRWHVWKDWWKHUHDUH
VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHV LQFRQVXPSWLRQHVWLPDWHVE\ WKH5XVVLDQSRSXODWLRQ IRU
a number of food products, according to trade statistics and household surveys. 
This implies that expenditures on food may be incorrectly stated by households.
Each of the aforementioned microeconomic areas uses household survey data. 
Both areas have similar defects. A selection shift (no samples from high-income 
households) prevents the full extent of the shadow economy from being deter-
mined based on sample data. There is the problem of comparing multi-temporal 
FDVKÀRZV6KDGRZLQFRPHVWKDWGRQRWDSSHDULQFRQVXPSWLRQDUHQRWFDSWXUHG
%DUVXNRYDZKLOH WKHODFNRI UHOLDEOH LQIRUPDWLRQRQ WKHWRWDOGLVWULEX-
tion of households by income and expenditures creates problems for replicating 
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estimates across the general population and prevents the comparison of results 
EHWZHHQPDFURDQGPLFURDSSURDFKHV+RZHYHU WKHUH LV LQGHSHQGHQWYDOXH LQ
modeling concealed income based on household budget survey data, because 
such models can be built separately for different segments of the population and 
can analyze the determinants for escaping into the shadow in greater detail for 
different socio-demographic and socio-professional groups.
7KH¿UVWDUHDZDVWKHEDVLVIRUWKHSDSHUE\*RURGQLFKHQNRHWDOZKR
did not directly estimate the size of the informal economy but analyzed the im-
pact of tax reforms in Russia (the transition to proportional taxation in 2001) on 
the amount of tax revenues and the incentives for households to exit the shadow 
economy. They also assessed the impact of the reforms on public welfare. 
One of the key works mentioned in many empirical studies on microdata is 
3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHU,WVOLJKWO\ZHDNHQHGWKHSUHPLVHVGH¿QHGDERYHDQG
subjected them to criticism. The authors suggest that: 1) all households correctly 
state their expenses on certain types of goods and 2) some types of households cor-
UHFWO\VWDWHWKHLULQFRPH7KHWHUP³W\SHRIKRXVHKROG´LVXQGHUVWRRGDVEHORQJLQJWR
one of the groups based on the source of income. According to the authors, the type 
of expenditures that are least likely to be concealed is food expenses (a hypo thesis 
contrary to the contemporary Russian reality), and not all of the self-employed tend 
to hide their income, but only those who have a certain amount of income from 
³VHOIHPSOR\PHQW´$FFRUGLQJ WR WKHDXWKRUVKRXVHKROGVZKRVHPDLQVRXUFHRI
income is wages state their income correctly. The article offers a direct way to es-
WLPDWH WKHVL]HRI WKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\7KH¿UVW VWDJHHVWLPDWHV WKHH[SHQGLWXUH
function for certain categories of goods, designed on the basis of economic theory. 
The second stage considers this function using the method proposed by the authors, 
and real household income is reproduced based on reported expenditures.
Lyssiotou et al. (2004) developed the ideas of Pissarides and Weber and sug-
JHVWHGWZRQHZDSSURDFKHVWKH¿UVWLQYROYHVDVVHVVLQJDVLQJOHHTXDWLRQIRUIRRG
H[SHQGLWXUHVE\XVLQJDQRQOLQHDUPHWKRGWKHVHFRQGHVWLPDWHVDV\VWHPRIGH-
mand for current consumer goods based on a breakdown of household expenses.
7KHEDVLFLGHDRIWKHSUHGHFHVVRUV¶PRGHOLVWRVSOLWGHPDQGIRUFXUUHQWFRQ-
VXPHUJRRGVDQGGXUDEOHJRRGV&RQVLGHULQJWKHGLIIHUHQWFDWHJRULHVRIGHPDQG
the authors note that the portion of income a household spends on various cat-
egories depends not only on income but also on its source. As statistics show, 
self-employed households spend more on luxury goods while spending too little 
RQIRRGDQGRWKHUQHFHVVLWLHVJLYHQWKHVL]HRIDKRXVHKROG¶VWRWDOLQFRPH
This method estimates the size of the shadow economy (hereinafter, the size 
of concealed household income) without studying the residual variations in 
household incomes. This is its advantage because there is no need for special 
calculations of the upper and lower limits of the shadow economy parameter. 
The disadvan tage of this method is its lower statistical capacity compared to 
3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHU¶VDSSURDFK
These methods analyze concealed income drawing on the economic interests 
RILQGLYLGXDOV+RZHYHUDVWXG\RIWKHLQFHQWLYHVFRQWLQJHQWXSRQVRFLDOLQWHUDF-
tions among people is also noteworthy. The authors of many empirical studies 
VXJJHVWWKDWDQLQGLYLGXDOGHFLGHVRQKLVKHUHPSOR\PHQWLQWKHLQIRUPDOVHFWRU
of the economy based on the interests of other people. Montmarquette and Gardes 
(2002) modeled this approach, taking into account the correlation between house-
<D0XUDVKRY75DWQLNRYD5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
hold decisions and the estimated size of the reference group (the group of people 
LQÀXHQFLQJWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO
$QRWKHUHPSLULFDO VWXG\E\*DUGHVDQG6WDU]HF ZKLFKDQDO\]HGVR-
cial interactions between different types of households, was based on an analysis 
RIWKHVKDGRZVHFWRULQ3RODQGGXULQJWKHWUDQVLWLRQSHULRGV$FRPPRQ
feature of transition economies is that the constraints on the consumer market 
are replaced by restrictions on the production market. Therefore, according to 
WKHVXUYH\VPRVWKRXVHKROGVLQGLFDWHLQVXI¿FLHQWLQFRPHDVDUHDVRQIRUZRUN-
LQJLQWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\)RU3RODQGLQWKHVDJULFXOWXUHZDVWKHPDLQ
sector of shadow employment, but after 2004, tax evasion became the main rea-
son. The probability of participation in the shadow economy increases for the un-
employed, young people, and people with higher education degrees. 
Accounting for the social interaction of households and the allocation of ex-
penses into purchases of goods in the formal and informal sectors are areas for 
future research, and there is currently no ability yet to implement them based 
RQ 5XVVLDQ VWDWLVWLFDO GDWD +RZHYHU EDVHG RQ WKH5/06 GDWDEDVH 5XVVLD
/RQJLWXGLQDO0RQLWRULQJ6XUYH\VHH5/06+6(XVHGLQWKHSUHVHQWSD-
per, it is possible to apply a theoretical model and, with some substantial modi-
¿FDWLRQVDQHPSLULFDODOJRULWKP7KHVHZHUHXVHG WRHVWLPDWH WKHVL]HRIFRQ-
cealed income in the (now classic) paper by Pissarides and Weber. 
3. Theoretical model
As noted above, the theoretical model in this study is based on the model 
GHYHORSHGE\3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHUIRXQGHUVRIWKHPLFURHFRQRPLFDS-
proach to estimating the size of the shadow economy. Their approach is both 
simple and informative because, with the right expenditures category, the model 
obtains unbiased estimates of the share of concealed income for self-employed 
households with different characteristics. 
7KHWKHRUHWLFDO PRGHO SUHVHQWHG E\ 3LVVDULGHV DQG:HEHU  GHVFULEHV
the behavior of user households while taking into account hidden income on 
the one hand, and the relationship between income and consumption on the other. 
The function of consumer spending i by households on a group of goods j 
reads as follows: 
ln Cij = Z'i Įj  +  ȕj  ln Yip  +  İij  (1)
where Cij is the consumption of a group of goods jZi is the household i¶VFKDUDF-
WHULVWLFVYHFWRUYipLVWKH³SHUPDQHQWLQFRPH´LHWKHSRUWLRQRILQFRPHDIIHFW-
LQJFRQVXPHUGHFLVLRQVDQGȕj is the marginal propensity to consume the group 
of products j.
In turn, permanent income is related to actual (real) income Yi through the fol-
lowing ratio:
Yi = pi Yip  (2)
where pi is the income variation due to unforeseen circumstances and is a random 
variable for households. 
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The authors suggest that the differences between permanent and actual in-
come are attributable to external economic factors (e.g., adverse economic con-
GLWLRQVDFURVVWKHFRXQWU\RULQDVHSDUDWHEUDQFKZKRVHYHFWRURILQÀXHQFHLV
not dependent on the type of household by income source. Therefore, the average 
value of piLVQRWGHSHQGHQWRQWKHW\SHRIKRXVHKROG+RZHYHUWKHYDULDQFHRI
this parameter is related to the type of household: V (  pi  |  i  –  ee) < V (  pi  |  i  –  se).
For self-employed households (i  –  se), the dispersion parameter pi is greater 
than for hired households (i  –  ee) their income variance is higher (income for 
WKHVHOIHPSOR\HGLV OHVVVWDEOH+HUHLQDIWHU WKHee index refers to households 
whose main source of income is wages, and the se index refers to households 
whose primary source of income is derived from self-employment. 
In accordance with the premises of the model, Yi is not observable, because 
the income of self-employed households is stated incorrectly. If ki is taken as 
the ratio indicating by how many times the real household income Yi exceeds 
the stated income net of taxes Yid, then the relationship between real and stated 
income will read as follows:
Yi = ki Yid  
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKHWKHRU\ HPSOR\HHV VWDWH WKHLU LQFRPH FRUUHFWO\ WKHUHIRUH
for households whose members are hired, ki =  1. For the self-employed, the ki 
parameter represents a random variable, and ki > 1. 
Thus, the unobserved permanent income, which is associated with the con-
sumption function, can be expressed through current income and the model pa-
rameters as follows: 
ln Yip = ln Yid  –  ln  pi  +  ln  ki (4)
where ln  pi and ln  ki are two additional random regressors. 
To verify the statistical hypothesis that households hide part of their income, 
we need assumptions about the distribution of the ln  pi and ln  ki parameters re-
sponsible for the discrepancy between observed income and permanent income. 
The authors suggest considering this distribution to be lognormal (because, ac-
cording to the theory, such is the distribution of household income). In this case, 
the model parameters can be represented as the sum of their averages and devia-
tions from the averages: 
ln  pi = ȝp  +  ui ,  ln  ki = ȝk  +  vi (5)
Then, the consumption function will read as follows:
ln Cij = Z'i Įj  +  ȕj  ln Yid  –  ȕj ( ȝp  –  ȝk )  –  ȕj ( ui  –  vi )  +  İij  (6)
The dependent variable is a certain category of household expenditures. 
3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHUFRQVLGHUHGIRRGH[SHQGLWXUHV
The expected value of pi is related to ȝp as follows: 
ln E ( pi ) = ȝp  +   2
1
 ı
2
u (7)
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If E ( pi ) is not dependent on the type of household employment, E ( ln  pi ) does 
QRWGHSHQGRQLWHLWKHUWKHUHIRUHLWLVSRVVLEOHWRFRPSDUHWKHPHDQORJDULWKPLF
values for the hired the and the self-employed: 
ȝpse  –  ȝpee =  2
1
 (ı
2
uee  –  ı 2use  
If equation (6) is estimated separately for hired workers and the self- employed, 
the constant will vary within the model because the value of ȝkse  –  ȝkee will be dif-
ferent for each group of households ( ȝkse  =  0 for hired employees and ȝkse  >  0 for the self-employed). The information about the size of the shadow economy is 
conveyed by the value of this constant.
Rather than estimating the model based on two separate subsamples of hired 
employees and the self-employed, we can introduce a dummy variable to account 
for the type of household employment, and use a linear regression in the following 
form:
ln Cij = Z'i Įj  +  ȕj  ln Yid  +  Ȗj  DSEi  +  ȟij  
where DSEi  =  1 if the household is self-employed, and 0 otherwise. This model 
can be estimated with ordinary OLS, adjusted for the heteroscedasticity of the er-
ror ȟij. 
Estimating this equation, we can calculate the assessment of the under-report-
ed income parameter ki (indicating how many times the real income of a house-
hold exceeds the income stated). 
If we assume that the marginal propensity to consume the j th category of goods 
ȕj coincides for self-employed and hired workers, the ȖjFRHI¿FLHQWKDVWKHIRO-
lowing meaning:
Ȗj = E{  – ȕj ( ȝp  –  ȝk ) |  se }   –  E{  – ȕj ( ȝp  –  ȝk ) |  ee }  (10)
7KHDERYHDQDO\VLVDQGH[SUHVVLRQVKRZWKDW
Ȗj = ȕj {   ȝk  +  21 (ı 2use  –  ı 2uee )}  (11)
We can estimate the difference in the error variances of income between self-
employed and hired workers based on an income decomposition, but this would 
require building auxiliary regressions of observed income for each of the two 
household categories.
Observable income can be represented as follows:
ln Yid = Z'i į1  +  X'i į2  +  ȗi  (12)
where Zi LVWKHYHFWRURIKRXVHKROGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVXi LVWKHVHWRILQVWUXPHQWV
ȗi  =  ui  –  vi for self-employed and ȗi  =  ui for hired employees.
Then, ı 2ȗ VH  –  ı 2ȗ HH  =  ı 2use  –  2cov (u, v)se  +  ı 2vse  –  ı 2uee. Because (12)  implies that 
ȝk  =  ȕj
Ȗj   –  
2
1
 
(ı 2use  –  ı 2uee ), then ȝk  +  2
1
 
ı 2vse  =  ȕj
Ȗj   +  
2
1
 
(ı 2vse  –  ı 2use  +  ı 2uee ).
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A point estimate of the expected value of the under-reported income parameter 
cannot be found because the value of cov (u, v)se  is unknown, but it is possible to 
calculate an interval estimate for this parameter. 
If we accept the assumption that cov (u, v)se  =  0, then the lower limit of the in-
terval is determined subject to the condition that ı 2vse  =   0, and the upper limit is 
obtained when making the assumption ı 2use  =  ı 2uee (self-employed income is at 
least as volatile as hired income). 
In this case, the interval limits are expressed through residual income vari-
ances ı 2ȗ VH and ı 2ȗ HH: 
( ln  k )low  =   ȕj
Ȗj   –  
2
1
 
(ı 2ȗ VH  –  ı 2ȗ HH)  
( ln  k )up  =   ȕj
Ȗj   +  
2
1
 
(ı 2ȗ VH  –  ı 2ȗ HH)  
Based on the calculated limits of the under-reported income parameter, 
we came to a conclusion about the real income of households participating in 
the shadow economy (self-employed households according to the model). 
Researchers are not only interested in the overall analytic result across the en-
tire available sample of households but also in a more detailed study of the por-
tion of concealed income across various socio-demographic groups. 
4. Hypotheses of the study
5XVVLD¶VVKDGRZHFRQRP\DFFRUGLQJWR%XURYDQG6DPDUXNKDFRQ-
VLVWVRIIRXUVHFWRUV²WKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\ WKHLOOHJDOHFRQRP\ WKH¿FWLWLRXV
economy, and the concealed economy — and three types of relationships. 
7KHVXEMHFWVRIWKH¿UVWW\SHRIUHODWLRQVKLSDUHODUJHEXVLQHVVHVWKDWJDLQHG
DFFHVVWRSRZHUDOORFDWLRQGLVWULEXWLRQDQGDVVLJQPHQWRIPDWHULDODQG¿QDQFLDO
resources. This segment of the population is not represented in the RLMS house-
hold budget survey data and, therefore, is not touched upon in this study. 
The second type of relationship involves representatives of various socio- 
professional business groups whose goal is to obtain funds for business develop-
ment and personal business income due to the paid satisfaction of the mass needs 
of the population (illegal sector and concealed component of activities). This seg-
ment of the population is poorly represented in the RLMS data.
The third type of relationship involves representatives of various socio-profes-
sional groups whose purpose is to make a living through paid satisfaction of mass 
needs of the population (informal sector). It is this segment of the population that 
is best represented in the RLMS data, and it is to this segment that our research 
hypotheses refer.
The shadow activities of individuals and households in the informal sector of 
the economy, according to Burov and Samarukha (2010), can be divided into four 
levels:
x WKH¿UVWOHYHOLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHEDVLFSK\VLRORJLFDOVXUYLYDORIDIDPLO\
x WKHVHFRQGOHYHOLVUHODWHGWRSK\VLRORJLFDODQGLQWHOOHFWXDOVXUYLYDO
x WKHWKLUGOHYHOUHIHUVWRVWULYLQJIRUGHYHORSPHQWDQGLPSURYHPHQW
x the fourth level is an attempt to lay a material foundation for future. 
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'HSHQGLQJRQWKHOHYHORIKRXVHKROGVKDGRZDFWLYLWLHVZHZLOOGLIIHUHQWLDWH
between reported income, expenditures for certain goods, and the size of under-
reported income.
We will assume that the level of household shadow activities is largely deter-
mined by its level of monetary income and the opportunities that exist for house-
holds living in various types of settlements. 
Based on monetary income, households can be divided into three groups: 
x income below half the median across the sample (such households are clas-
VL¿HGDVSRRUDQGWKHLUVKDGRZDFWLYLWLHVDUHVXSSRVHGO\GULYHQE\¿UVWDQG
VHFRQGOHYHOUHDVRQV
x income between half of the median and one-and-a-half times the median 
(the rationale for such households presumably corresponds to second- and 
WKLUGOHYHOUHDVRQV
x LQFRPHDERYHRQHDQGDKDOIPHGLDQVDIÀXHQWKRXVHKROGVZLWKIRXUWKOHYHO
reasons).
Hypothesis 1. The share of under-reported concealed income is higher in 
the lower and upper income groups than in the middle income group. 
In support of this hypothesis, we can draw on the following arguments. In 
the lower income group, people may be unable to earn reportable income because 
of a lack of jobs in the legal sector as well as the low level of skill or its inconsis-
WHQF\ZLWKWKHVWUXFWXUHRIDYDLODEOHMREVWKHUHIRUHDOPRVWDOORIWKHLQFRPHZLOO
be concealed because of the need to ensure physical survival. The middle group 
LQFOXGHVKRXVHKROGVIRUZKRPDVLJQL¿FDQWSRUWLRQRI LQFRPHLVGHULYHGIURP
ZDJHVWKHVHKRXVHKROGVDUHQRWDVVWURQJO\PRWLYDWHGWRFRQFHDOWKHLUHDUQLQJV
as members of the lower group. The upper income group contains representatives 
RIWKHDIÀXHQWVHJPHQWVRIVRFLHW\ZKRDUHQRWFRQFHUQHGZLWKSK\VLFDOVXUYLYDO
DQGIRUZKRPKLUHGHPSOR\PHQWGRHVQRWVHHPDWWUDFWLYH+RZHYHUZKHQSURP-
ising business opportunities arise, the proceeds from them may be concealed to 
a great extent because of the desire not to attract attention from the criminal ele-
ment of the shadow economy and the regulatory agencies, as well as the desire to 
optimize tax deductions. 
+RXVHKROGV FDQ EH JURXSHG E\ VHWWOHPHQW W\SH EDVHG RQ WZR IDFWRUV VL]H
or administrative status. The hypotheses underlying the choice of these target 
groups are as follows.
Hypothesis 2. In small settlements and cities with million-plus populations, 
the share of under- reported income is higher than in medium-sized towns and 
villages.
This hypothesis seems valid because, in the former case, the number of for-
mal jobs is very limited and people are forced to seek shadow income to support 
themselves, while in the latter case, on the contrary, there are a very large number 
of attractive opportunities for shadow earnings, especially in metropolitan areas.
Hypothesis 3. In rural areas and regional centers, the proportion of hidden 
income is higher than in urban settlements and secondary cities. 
,QD OLWHUDWXUHUHYLHZRQ WKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\6PLWKFRQFOXGHG WKDW
the informal economy is mostly run by the self-employed who own small family 
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businesses. Such enterprises are widely represented in rural areas, e.g., in agricul-
WXUHIRUHVWU\¿VKHULHVFRQVWUXFWLRQGLVWULEXWLRQDQGUHSDLUV,QUHJLRQDOFHQWHUV
where schools, medical facilities, shopping malls and markets are concentrated, 
there are additional opportunities such as tutoring, private medical services, pri-
vate trucking, and various forms of freelancing.
5. Data description 
7KLVVHFWLRQGHVFULEHVVDPSOLQJUHVWULFWLRQVFODVVL¿HVKRXVHKROGVDQGH[DPL
nes in detail the characteristic features that differentiate self-employed house-
holds from others. Studying these features is necessary to determine the consis-
tency of data and key hypotheses for the model and is necessary for the choice of 
control variables and variables for the instrumentation of income in the consump-
tion equation.
The paper uses data from the 21st RLMS wave (2012), which represents 
a non-governmental longitudinal household survey. The RLMS covers a wide 
range of issues and produces an extensive base of socio-economic variables that 
can describe the structure of income and expenditure, the structure of food con-
sumption, the level of material well-being of the population, education levels, 
investment, occupations, migration, health, etc. The wave includes individual 
and households data. The sample represents the current (2012) situation in house-
holds of the Russian Federation (more precisely, the income groups of Russian 
households available for the RLMS). 
The following charts demonstrate the relevance of the RLMS sampling distri-
bution by income in 2012 for the income distribution of the total Russian popula-
WLRQLQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHRI¿FLDO5RVVWDWGDWD
Fig. 1 shows that the selected distribution of households by income is biased to 
the left: low-income groups in the population are much more widely represented 
than in the distribution for the general population. The right end of the sampling 
GLVWULEXWLRQLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\ WKLQQHU WKDQWKHULJKWHQGRI WKHJHQHUDOSRSXODWLRQ
distribution, suggesting a small number of representatives from upper income 
groups in the RLMS sample. The global maximum for the sampling distribu-
Fig. 1. Bar charts for the distribution of the Russian population by monthly income  
per capita, 2012 (RUB thousand).
6RXUFH RLMS data for 2012, and the household budget survey data from Rosstat, adjusted for balance of 
income and expenditure indicators for the population during the same period.
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WLRQIDOOVZLWKLQWKHLQWHUYDOIURP58%XSWR58%SHUPRQWKSHU
person, whereas the global maximum for the general population distribution is 
within the interval from RUB 15,000 to RUB 20,000 per month per person.
$FRPSDULVRQRIGLVWULEXWLRQVVKRZVWKDWDGLUHFWUHSOLFDWLRQRI WKH¿QGLQJV
from this study on the entire population would be impossible. We can only speak 
of modeling under-reported income for low- and medium-income segments of 
the population. 
5.1. Income decomposition
To build the model, it is important to carefully examine the typology of house-
holds and household income distribution across the main sources. There are three 
such sources:
QHWZDJHV
³RWKHULQFRPH´ZKLFKLQFOXGHVSHQVLRQVVFKRODUVKLSVXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQ-
H¿WVLQFRPHIURPWKHVDOHRIKRXVLQJLQFRPHIURPKRXVLQJUHQWLQWHUHVWLQFRPH
from capital, dividend income from capital, alimony, debt payment subsidies and 
KRXVLQJSD\PHQWVXEVLGLHV
LQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQWGH¿QHGDVIROORZV
income from self-employment = total income – wage – “other income”
)RUPDOO\LQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQWLVSDUWRI³XQHDUQHGLQFRPH´
unearned income = total income – wage
As we see from the descriptive statistics (Table 2), approximately 45% of 
households earn a positive income from self-employment. The average in-
come from wages is the greatest among all mean values for various sources of 
LQFRPHKRXVHKROGVHDUQ58%RQDYHUDJH7KHPHDQYDOXHRI³RWKHU
LQFRPH´ LV58%ZKLFK LV WLPHVKLJKHU WKDQ WKHDYHUDJH LQFRPH
IURP VHOIHPSOR\PHQW 58%$W WKHVDPH WLPH WKHPHDQ YDOXHV DUH
shown for households with positive income. 
An important part of the study is the analysis of variance of different income 
FRPSRQHQWV,QFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQWKDVWKHJUHDWHVWFRHI¿FLHQWRIYDULD-
WLRQDWWKHUDWLRRIWKHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQWRWKHPHDQ2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
WKHFRHI¿FLHQWRIYDULDWLRQIRU³RWKHUFRPSRQHQWV´RILQFRPHLVWKHORZHVW
Table 2
'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVRILQFRPHGHFRPSRVLWLRQ
Statistics Total 
income
Wages Other 
income
Unearned 
income
Income from  
self-employment
N ( >  0)  4412 4475 5241 
Number of zero values 158 2105 2042 1276 
Average    16 676 
Standard error    18 867 
6WDQGDUGHUURUPHDQ   0.71  
Minimum   85 50 0
Maximum 425 600 420 000 175 000  
25% quartile 16 200 15 000 7800 8000 
50% quartile 28 000 26 000 11 200 12 500 2724.5
75% quartile 46 408 44 000 17 800 20 200 
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because the most important element within them is the least-variable part of in-
come, i.e., pensions, scholarships, etc. The variation in wages is greater than for 
income from self-employment, but the relative variation, or the ratio of the stan-
dard deviation to the mean value, is higher for income from self-employment 
FRPSDUHGZLWK7KLVHPSLULFDOIDFWPHDQVZHGRQRWKDYHWRUHMHFW
the hypothesis that income from self-employment is more volatile, allowing us 
WRFDUU\RXWWKHGHFRPSRVLWLRQE\3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHU7KLVGHFRPSR-
sition is based on the hypothesis that wages are stated correctly, while income 
from self-employment is under-reported. According to this model, the residual 
error in the income equation should be highest for the self-employed and can 
be used to estimate a parameter that would be used to adjust income from self-
employment.
$VHSDUDWHWDVNLVWKHFODVVL¿FDWLRQRIKRXVHKROGVGLYLVLRQLQWRVHOIHPSOR\HG
and others) which can be solved by studying the proportion of income from self-
employment out of total household income. Fig. 2 shows that the distribution of 
this proportion is asymmetrical: a large portion of households receive either zero 
or a small fraction of their total income from self-employment. The histogram 
LGHQWL¿HVWKHVKDUHWKUHVKROGYDOXHLWLV3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHUXVHG
All households deriving more than 20% of their income from self-employment 
will be categorized in the study as self-employed. 
A noticeable spike in the distribution around a proportion of 1 indicates 
the presence of a large group of households for which income from self-employ-
ment is their primary income. 
7DEOHH[SORUHVWKHGLIIHUHQFHVDPRQJKRXVHKROGVLQGLFDWLQJWKHSUHVHQFHRU
ODFNRILQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQW7KHRI¿FLDOO\VHOIHPSOR\HGKDYHKLJKHU
incomes, on average, which are also more volatile. We have seen above that in-
FRPH IURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQWKDV DKLJKHU FRHI¿FLHQW RI YDULDWLRQ WKDQ LQFRPH
IURPZDJHV+RZHYHU LW LVZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW LQVLGH WKHVHJPHQW RI RI¿FLDOO\
VHOIHPSOR\HGKRXVHKROGVLQFRPHIURPZDJHVKDVDKLJKHUFRHI¿FLHQWRIYDUL-
ation than income from self-employment. This fact, as well as an analysis of 
the chart, indicates the heterogeneity of self-employed groups and the need to 
divide households not into two groups (hired and self-employed), but into three: 
self-employed, people with a low share of income from self-employment, and 
people with zero income from self-employment.
Fig. 2.'LVWULEXWLRQRIWKHSURSRUWLRQRIKRXVHKROGLQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQWZLWKLQWKHVDPSOH 
DPRQJKRXVHKROGVZLWKSRVLWLYHLQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQWN 
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7KHPRGHO¶VODVWLPSRUWDQWDVVXPSWLRQUHTXLUHGWRHVWLPDWHWKHVKDGRZHFRQR
my factor is the lognormality of household income. This assumption has been veri-
¿HG EDVHG RQ HPSLULFDO GDWD XVLQJ WKH.ROPRJRURY6PLUQRY FULWHULRQ7KHK\-
SRWKHVLVLVQRWUHMHFWHGDWDVLJQL¿FDQFHOHYHORIIRUWRWDOLQFRPHRUIRULQFRPH
from self-employment (the estimated probability of a Type I error is 14.7% for total 
income and 1.4% for income from self-employment).
5.2. Descriptive statistics for the socio-demographic characteristics  
 of households
The choice of control variables (household characteristics) is an important 
part of the technique for estimating the proportion of under-reported household 
income that will be implemented in this study. Appendix Table A1 describes 
WKHVDPSOLQJIUDPHZRUNIRUWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRILQGLYLGXDOVFODVVL¿HGDFFRUG-
LQJ WR W\SHRIHPSOR\PHQW WRWDO LQGLYLGXDOVQRW UHODWHG WR WKHVHOIHPSOR\HG
individuals whose income from self-employment is less than 20% of their total 
LQFRPHLQGLYLGXDOVZKRVHLQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQWLVPRUHWKDQRI
their income. 
In this study, income from self-employment means all income from entrepre-
neurial activity, regardless of whether the employer is self-employed (working 
for himself) or an individual entrepreneur who hires employees. (This paper uses 
a slightly different principle for categorizing individuals as self-employed than 
that used in Lukyanova (2012), where an individual is assigned to this group if 
registered as an individual entrepreneur or the founder of a legal entity or if self-
GHVFULEHGDVXQRI¿FLDOO\VHOIHPSOR\HG
3HRSOHTXDOL¿HGDVVNLOOHGODERULQFOXGHLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKLQ,6&2JURXSV±
lawyers or government employees, expert professionals of the highest catego-
ry, skilled workers in agriculture, industry workers, or other skilled workers. 
8QVNLOOHGZRUNHUVLQFOXGHUHVSRQGHQWVZLWKLQ,6&2JURXSV±PHGLXPVNLOOHG
specialists, clerks, services and trade employees, and unskilled workers. The ba-
sic education group includes those with a completed or incomplete secondary 
education.
Table 3
'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVWRGHFRPSRVHLQFRPHIRUKRXVHKROGVZLWKSRVLWLYHLQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQW
grouped by the proportion of income from self-employment out of total income (RUB).
Type of income Average Standard  
error
Minimum  
value
Maximum 
value
Statistics for households reporting low income from self-employment (< 20%) ( N = 1947)
Total income   1000 276 500
Wages   0 
Other income  10 052.66 0 
Income from self-employment 
(estimate)
  0 
6WDWLVWLFVIRUKRXVHKROGVUHSRUWLQJKLJKLQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQW1 
Total income  50 014.41 1500 
Wages 14 866.87  0 220 000
Other income   0 120 000
Income from self-employment   600 
72 <D0XUDVKRY75DWQLNRYD5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
To describe the resulting patterns, we will, for the sake of brevity, regard 
the self-employed as individuals who earn more than 20% of their income from 
self-employment. 
We can conclude from Appendix Table A1 that the self-employed are more of-
ten single than married. They are more often engaged in unskilled labor, which is 
true for heads of families as well as for regular members of the household. They 
KDYHORZHUOHYHOVRIHGXFDWLRQZKHWKHUKLJKHUYVRUVHFRQG-
DU\YRFDWLRQDOYVDQGWKH\KDYHDKLJKHUOHYHORIVDWLVIDFWLRQ
ZLWK OLIH YV6HOIHPSOR\HGKRXVHKROGVKDYHD VLJQL¿FDQWO\
ODUJHUSURSRUWLRQRIVFKRROVWXGHQWVDQGDVOLJKWO\ODUJHUSURSRUWLRQRI
FROOHJHVWXGHQWVWKDQKRXVHKROGVZLWKQRLQFRPHIURPVHOIHPSOR\PHQW
(28.5% and 17.1%). 
The self-employed want to get another job more often than hired employees 
YVEXWWKH\GRQRWVWDWHWKDWWKH\KDYHDMREDWWKHPRPHQW
(which perhaps means they are concealing the shadow portion of their income, or 
have no other paid sources of income). Financial opportunities and opportunities 
WRLPSURYHOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVWRWDNHDYDFDWLRQRUWRSD\IRUDFKLOG¶VHGXFDWLRQ
are no different for the self-employed from the average level of the full sample, 
although these opportunities exceed the capacity of those who have a small por-
tion of income from self-employment. 
We can conclude that a number of selected characteristics of household mem-
bers should be used in a regression analysis because they correct some structural 
differences between households of the self-employed and of hired employees and 
PD\DIIHFWDKRXVHKROG¶VLQWHQWLRQWRKLGHWKHLULQFRPH
 'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVRIWKHHFRQRPLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIKRXVHKROGV
$SSHQGL[7DEOH$VKRZVVRPHRIWKHFDWHJRULHVXVHGLQWKHPRGHORIYDUL-
ables and variables that can be used as instrumental: settlement type, real estate 
ownership and the equipment in housing facilities, land ownership, the presence 
of crops (including those for sale), the ownership of vehicles and machinery for 
cultivating land, the possession of a computer and internet access, and the pos-
session of other durable goods.
Based on descriptive statistics analysis, we can conclude that the self-em-
SOR\HGOLYHPRUHRIWHQLQUXUDODUHDVYVIRUWKHVXEVDPSOHRILQGL-
viduals with zero income from self-employment) than in towns (18.7% vs. 27.4% 
for the sub-sample of individuals with zero income from self-employment). In 
the regional centers, their number is roughly the same. 
Regarding housing, the self-employed own a greater amount of total area and 
residential area, with a large number of rooms, than those having no income 
from self-employment or having a small income from it. They are less frequently 
equipped with central water supply, central plumbing, hot water supply, sewer, 
gas and telephone. They prefer satellite antennae to cable television. Less often 
than other types of households, they have cottages, lawnmowers, a foreign-made 
car with a GPS navigator, a washing machine and a microwave, but they more 
often own trucks, motorcycles and tractors, and they sell their crops more often 
(5.7% vs 2.2%, and 1.1% for the sub-sample of individuals with no income from 
VHOIHPSOR\PHQW'HVNWRSFRPSXWHUVDUHOHVVFRPPRQZLWKWKHVHOIHPSOR\HG
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while laptops are more common. Low-speed internet is more affordable for 
the self-employed than broadband. 
The statistics show that among the self-employed with a high proportion of 
income from self-employment, there must be a substantial proportion of farmers 
(farms).
5.4. Cost decomposition
7KH¿QDOVWHSRIWKHSUHOLPLQDU\GDWDVWXG\LVWRGHFRPSRVHFRVWVRQWKHEDVLV
of which we will build the variables for the equation model.
+RXVHKROGV UHSRUW LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKHQXPEHU RI SXUFKDVHG SURGXFWV WKHLU
prices, and overall expenses over the past seven days. Monthly household expen-
ditures on food represent the sum of expenditures for all products, normalized to 
DGD\SHULRG
According to the theory, household expenses can be divided into expenditures 
for the purchase of durable goods and current consumer goods. Expenditures for 
current consumer goods include food, clothing, and services. Spending on du-
rable goods includes expenditures for purchasing household appliances.
Table 4 demonstrates that for households with positive income from self-em-
ployment, there is a high degree of heterogeneity in expenditures. All expen-
ditures for the self-employed are higher for all categories than the average for 
the entire sample (excluding expenditures on food) and are higher than expen-
ditures by households with a low proportion of income from self-employment. 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWRWDOLQFRPHIRUWKHVHOIHPSOR\HGLVDOVRVLJQL¿FDQWO\KLJKHU
(whereas the average household incomes from other parts of the sample are not 
Table 4
'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVIRUKRXVHKROGH[SHQGLWXUHVLQFOXGLQJWKHFRQVXPSWLRQRIKRXVHKROGSURGXFHGJRRGV58%
Entire 
sample
No 
income 
IURPVH
Share of 
revenue 
from  
VH
Share of 
revenue 
from  
VH
Expenditures for meals at home, normalized to 
GD\V
   
&RQVXPSWLRQRIKRPHSURGXFHGJRRGV 458 445 520 
Expenditures for meals at home, normalized to 
GD\VDGMXVWHGIRU
   
Expenditures for eating out, normalized to  
GD\V
1550 1718  1402
Estimated total expenditures for food  11 180 10 427 
Estimated total expenditures for food,  
adjusted for (*)
 11 625  
([SHQGLWXUHVIRUFORWKHVRYHUWKHSDVWGD\V  2486 2182 2770
([SHQGLWXUHVIRUVHUYLFHVRYHUWKHSDVWGD\V 7248  6641 
([SHQGLWXUHVIRUKHDOWKFDUHRYHUWKHSDVWGD\V  2127  2247
2WKHUH[SHQGLWXUHVRYHUWKHSDVWGD\V 2671 2765  
Total current consumer expenditures on goods for 
GD\V
26 012 26 502 24 202 27 877
Expenditures for durable goods, normalized to 
GD\V
 6866  
Total expenditures    
Total income    
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VLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQW7KHTXHVWLRQIRUWKHFXUUHQWUHVHDUFKLVZKHWKHUWKHGLI-
ferences in expenditures are attributable to stated income or whether there is 
some portion unaccounted for that is part of the shadow economy.
+RXVHKROGFRQVXPSWLRQLQFOXGHVJRRGVSURGXFHGIRUDKRXVHKROG¶VRZQFRQ-
sumption, and it is higher for self-employed households. This is more closely as-
VRFLDWHGZLWKWKHVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURIVHOIHPSOR\HGLQIDUPLQJKRXVHKROGVIRU
which this type of consumption is most characteristic, rather than concealed in-
FRPH&DVKH[SHQGLWXUHVRQIRRGIRUWKHVHOIHPSOR\HGKRXVHKROGVDQGWKHRWK-
ers do not vary greatly. 
6. Estimating the econometric model
Our approach involves estimating an equation of expeditures for an individual 
good that depends on identifying household indicators, including income and 
employment type (self-employed and others), to obtain an unbiased estimate of 
the under-reported income parameter. 
Food costs are often regarded in the literature as the most correctly presented 
in the statistics. The model uses a log-linear form for the dependency of expenses 
on income: 
ln ChF = Z'h Į  +  ȕF  ln Yh  +  ȖF  DSEh  +  uh
F
  (14)
where h LV WKHQXPEHU RI KRXVHKROGVChF LV IRRG H[SHQGLWXUHVYh LV LQFRPH
Zh LGHQWL¿HVWKHKRXVHKROG¶VLQGLFDWRUVDSEh is a dummy variable that assumes 
WKHYDOXHRI IRU WKHVHOIHPSOR\HGDQGRWKHUZLVH DQGuhF is random error, 
independently and identically (normally) distributed with zero mean. 
'XULQJWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHPRGHOWKHYDULDEOHDSEh (which indicates the type 
RIKRXVHKROGZDVIRXQGWREHVLJQL¿FDQWDWWKHOHYHOEXWQHJDWLYHO\7DEOH
This means that the self-employed spend less on food than other households, 
ZKLFKGRHVQRWFRUUHVSRQGWRWKHPRGHO¶VDVVXPSWLRQVDQGPDNHVLWLPSRVVLEOH
to estimate the size of concealed income based on the food expenditure equation. 
This is quite consistent with Suvorov (2008), indicating the unreliability of infor-
mation households report on their expenditures for food, and a strong overstate-
ment of declared expenses on a number of the most demanded products.
+RZHYHULWLVSRVVLEOHWRXVHWKHRWKHUKRXVHKROGH[SHQGLWXUHFDWHJRULHVWKDW
are reported, perhaps more appropriately, but expenditures must depend on over-
all household income rather than income structure (a condition necessary to cor-
UHFWO\DVVHVVWKHH[SHQGLWXUHHTXDWLRQ7KH¿UVWUHDVRQLVZK\H[SHQGLWXUHVIRU
durable goods are unsuitable. The second reason is why we cannot use expendi-
Table 5
&RPSDULVRQRIHVWLPDWHVRIH[SHQGLWXUHPRGHOVIRUFHUWDLQFDWHJRULHVRIJRRGV
&RHI¿FLHQW Model
Food expenditures 
(Pissarides–Weber)
Food expenditures 
(RLMS, 2012)
Spending on clothing 
(RLMS, 2012)
Ȗ  –0.1815*** 
ȕ   
1RWH7KHOHYHORIVLJQL¿FDQFH
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tures that include the cost of transportation and are linked to the place of work. 
&ORWKLQJH[SHQGLWXUHVPHHWERWKFRQGLWLRQVVRWKH\FDQEHXVHGDVDQLQGLFDWRU
RIDKRXVHKROG¶VZHOOEHLQJ
Thus, it is advisable to turn to the assessment of the equation where the depen-
dent variable is the logarithm of spending on clothes for adults and children over 
WKHSDVWGD\VWKHVFDOHRI WKHYDULDEOH LVQRW LPSRUWDQWDV ORQJDV WKHORJD-
rithm is used). 
ln ChCl = Z'h Į  +  ȕCl  ln Yh  +  ȖCl  DSEh  +  uh
Cl
  (15)
7KHVSHQGLQJ RQ FORWKLQJ PRGHO SURGXFHV D VLJQL¿FDQW FRHI¿FLHQW VKRZLQJ
an excess of expenditures by the self-employed compared with other groups in 
the sample. Table 5 shows the correlation between the model estimates of expendi-
tures on food and clothing in this study and those estimates obtained by Pissarides 
DQG:HEHUZKHQPRGHOLQJIRRGH[SHQGLWXUHV'LIIHUHQFHVLQHVWLPDWHVRI
the ȕFRHI¿FLHQWDUHGXHWRERWKWKHFKRLFHRIDGLIIHUHQWH[SHQGLWXUHVFDWHJRU\
and to differences in the standard of living for the Russian and British households 
described in Pissarides and Weber. The negative estimate of the ȖFRHI¿FLHQW LQ
WKHPRGHORI IRRGH[SHQGLWXUHV IRU5XVVLDQKRXVHKROGV VKRZV WKDW WKHPRGHO¶V
assumption of correctness for the declared food expenditures was incorrect for 
5XVVLDQKRXVHKROGV+RZHYHUWKHPRGHORIFORWKLQJH[SHQGLWXUHVDOORZVDPHDQ-
ingful estimate of the Ȗ parameter that is nearly identical to Pissarides and Weber's.
This model will be used as the basis for calculating the proportion of house-
hold income and researching the hidden dependencies of this value on the house-
KROG¶VVRFLRHFRQRPLFDQGGHPRJUDSKLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
It should be noted that the income value in equation (15) is correlated with 
an error because external shocks simultaneously affect household expenditures 
and income. Therefore, the income variable is endogenous in the cost model and 
needs instrumentation. (Another reason for the endogeneity of the income vari-
able, as previously mentioned, is its measurement errors). As identifying instru-
ments, XhZHXVHGWKHLQGLFDWRUVRIDKRXVHKROG¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIH[SHQVLYHGX-
rables and expensive foreign-made cars. The set of instruments turns out to be 
radically different from that used by Pissarides and Weber. The instruments are 
strong and exogenous and the details are listed in Appendix Table A2. (The cor-
UHFWQHVV RI WKH LQVWUXPHQWVZDV YDOLGDWHGE\ WKH+DQVHQ WHVW WKHUHOHYDQFHRI
the tools was validated by the Yogo test). 
Another methodological feature of this research is the use of random effects in 
WKHH[SHQGLWXUHPRGHORQDFRQVWDQWDQGDFRHI¿FLHQWRIȖ:
ln ChCl = Į0  +  Į0i  +  Zjh Įj  +  ȕCl  ln Yh  +  ( ȖCl  +  ȖCli )  DSEh  +  uh
Cl
  (16)
The i index means either the number of the income group to which a household 
belongs or the number of the group that corresponds to the size of the locality, or it 
means the number of the group corresponding to the administrative status of the lo-
cality where the household resides. Random effects for groups Į0i  ~  iid (0, ı2Į0
 ) and 
ȖCli  ~  iid (0, ıȖ2 ) are assumed to be uncorrelated among themselves and between 
groups. The use of this set of instruments enables us to estimate the model across 
WKHHQWLUHVDPSOHDQG LWSURYLGHVDQXPEHURIREVHUYDWLRQVVXI¿FLHQW WRREWDLQ
76 <D0XUDVKRY75DWQLNRYD5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
adequate estimates. This approach also improves the possibility of cross-group ex-
penditure heterogeneity and the heterogeneity of the distribution of self-employed 
households between the groups, which ensures the consistency of estimates.
Table 6 contains estimates of the elasticity of expenditures on clothing by in-
come ȕ for certain household categories and estimates of the ȖFRHI¿FLHQWLQGLFDW-
ing, after multiplying by 100, the percentage by which self-employed expendi-
tures exceed expenditures by other households, all other things being equal.
Table 6 shows that in terms of the settlement size, expenditures by the self- 
employed for clothing are higher than the expenditures of hired employees in 
metropolitan areas by approximately 15%, while in million-plus cities, small 
FLWLHVDQGXUEDQW\SHYLOODJHVWKH\DUHDSSUR[LPDWHO\KLJKHUDQGLQYLOODJ-
es, expenses for the self-employed are higher than those of hired emp loyees by 
approximately 5%. In terms of the administrative status of settlements, expendi-
tures on clothing by the self-employed in regional centers also exceed expendi-
tures by hired workers by 15%, while for all other types of settlement statuses, 
the excess is approximately 5–6%, and there are no large differences in the ex-
FHVV7KLVJUHDWO\DIIHFWVWKHVSHFL¿FVW\OHRIFORWKLQJFRQVXPSWLRQDQGWKHSULFH
range available at different types of settlements. Regarding income groups, poor 
self-employed households spend 20% more on clothing than other poor house-
holds, which is approximately 4 times greater than the differences between 
the self-employed and other households from the middle group, and about twice 
DVPXFKDVIRUWKHDIÀXHQWKRXVHKROGVDOORWKHUWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDO
These results suggest that differences in the consumption of clothing by 
the self-employed and other households do exist and vary considerably across in-
come and settlement groups. This allows us to assess the proportion of concealed 
income within the selected subgroups.
The next step to estimate the proportion of concealed income requires an evalu-
ation of residual income dispersions for the self-employed and other households 
Table 6
Estimates of ȕ and Ȗ.
Parameter 
estimate
Size of the locality
Less than 
100,000  
people
From 100,001 
to 400,000 
people
From 400,001 
to 1,000,000 
people
From 1,000,000 
to 10,000,000 
people
Over 
10,000,000 
people
Ȗ 0.0515  0.1258  0.1508
ȕ     
Parameter 
estimate
$ORFDOLW\¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVWDWXV
9LOODJH Urban-type 
village 
&LW\ Regional  
center
Ȗ 0.0561 0.0621 0.0601 0.1425
ȕ    
Parameter 
estimate
Income group
< 0.5 of  
median income
 0.5–1.5 of  
median income
> 1.5 of  
median income
Ȗ   
ȕ   
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on auxiliary regressions of the income logarithm against the household character-
istics vector Zi and a set of tools Xi and the subsequent calculation of lower and upper limits for the under-reported income parameter k (according to expressions 
DQG
The estimate of the under-reported income share is based on interval estimates 
of k as follows:
Shadow_Share  =  
Į,se  +  (1 –  Į) Iother
Į,se (k  – 1)  (17)
where k is the value of the under-reported income parameter (the higher the value , 
WKHJUHDWHUWKHQHHGWRDGMXVWWKHKRXVHKROGLQFRPHWRPHHWWKH³WUXH´OHYHOĮ is 
the share of self-employed households in the sample relative to the total num-
ber of households (the higher the percentage, the more households escape to 
WKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\Ise is the average income for the self-employed (the more 
HDUQHGE\WKHVHOIHPSOR\HGWKHJUHDWHUWKHDPRXQWRIDGMXVWHGLQFRPHIother is 
WKHDYHUDJHLQFRPHRIRWKHUKRXVHKROGVQRWVHOIHPSOR\HG+HUHDVLQWKHSDVW
the self-employed include those and only those households that obtain more than 
20% of their total income from self-employment.)
From the above expression, it follows that, in the event of equal incomes be-
tween the self-employed and other households, the share of the concealed in-
come will be proportional to the share of the self-employed within the sample. 
The higher the income of the self-employed compared to other household in-
come, the higher the estimate. 
Table 7 shows the results of estimating the under-reported income parameter 
and the proportion of income concealed across the analyzed sample of households. 
The median income for self-employed households exceeds the median income of 
WKHVDPSOHE\2WKHUKRXVHKROGVDUHEHORZWKHVDPSOHDYHUDJHE\
On average, the proportion of income concealed is 5% of common household 
LQFRPH3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHU¶VHVWLPDWHVIRU%ULWLVKKRXVHKROGV LQZHUH
5.5%, but the essential difference is that their sample was more related to the gen-
eral population, and their analysis demonstrated that, on average, the share of 
WKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\DFFRXQWVIRURI*'3LQWKH8.:HFDQQRWH[WUDSR-
late the sample estimates to the general population in this study, but we can try 
to extrapolate, subject to the interval distributions of per capita income based on 
Rosstat data and the RLMS sample for 2012, as described in Fig. 1 ( details of 
the calculations are shown in Appendix Table A7).
Table 7
Interval estimate of concealed income share.
The sample size 
Number of self-employed 660
Percentage of self-employed 0.150
Average total income (RUB) 
Average total income of the self-employed (RUB) 
Average total income of others (RUB) 
Lower limit of the under-reported income parameter 1.240
Upper limit of the under-reported income parameter 
Lower limit of the proportion of concealed income 0.040
Upper limit of the proportion of concealed income 0.060
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)LJGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWLQWKHODVW¿YHLQWHUYDOVRISHUFDSLWDLQFRPHWKH5/06
sample includes, on average, only 20% of the households from the correspond-
ing income groups within the general population, so the extrapolation produc-
es very rough estimates. Averaging across the extrapolated general population 
\LHOGVORZHUDQGXSSHUOLPLWVRIFRQFHDOHGLQFRPHRIDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\
These results fall within the range of estimates of the scale of the shadow econ-
RP\LQ5XVVLDLQJLYHQE\5RVVWDWEDVHGRQ61$DQGWKH¿QGLQJV
RILQGLYLGXDOH[SHUWV±IRUWKHVDPHSHULRG7DEOH+RZHYHUWKH\DUH
KDOIDVKLJKDV WKH:RUOG%DQN¶VHVWLPDWHV IRUVKRZQ LQ7DEOH
The differences might be explained by the fact that this study does not take into 
account the contribution of the shadow economy within the criminal sector.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the interval estimates of the share of concealed income, 
grouped by sub-samples of the RLMS sample for 2012. More detailed informa-
tion on the calculation results is provided in Appendix Tables A4–A6.
$VWXG\RIWKHVFKHGXOHVVKRZVWKDW+\SRWKHVLVin rural and regional centers, 
the share of concealed income is higher than in urban-type and secondary cities) 
does not contradict the data of the study (Fig. 4a). Further analysis shows that 
the descriptive statistics for the sample proportion are essential to farms, which, if 
they are not required to receive subsidies for development, avoid disclosing their 
economic activity. This produces a spike on the left end of the graph. With regard 
to the proportion of concealed income, there is a surge on the right end in regional 
FHQWHUV+HUHZHQHHGWREHFDUHIXOGUDZLQJFRQFOXVLRQVEHFDXVHUHJLRQDOFHQWHUV
are very heterogeneous in size and functions. This segment includes Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, and perhaps their presence in the subsample of households from 
regional centers leads to the high estimates of the share of concealed income. 
If we look at the situation from a different angle, dividing the households by 
VHWWOHPHQWVL]HLWDOOORRNVVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQW)LJE7KHUHIRUH+\SRWKHVLVin 
small settlements and million-plus cities, the proportion of concealed income is 
higher than in medium-sized towns and villages) is not completely consistent with 
the results of the estimation. With the growth of settlements up to 1 million people, 
the share of concealed income gradually grows to 10% of total household income. 
Fig. 3. Extrapolation of under-reported income share to the distribution of the general population by 
the income in the interval estimates based on per capita income and the distributions of  
per capita income  (RUB thousand). 
6RXUFH RLMS data for 2012, and the household budget survey data from Rosstat, adjusted for balance of 
income and expenditure indicators for the population during the same period.
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+RZHYHULQPLOOLRQSOXVFLWLHVLWVXGGHQO\IDOOVEHORZZKLOHLQPHWURSROLWDQ
DUHDV LW DJDLQ ULVHVDQG UHDFKHV LWVKLJKHVWPDUNDW3HUKDSV WKHIDLOXUHRI
cities is associated with the bias and the small size of the household sample (42) 
for this category. If we do not take into account these technical considerations, we 
can assume that in such cities, unlike previous categories, opportunities do arise for 
formal employment. At the same time, such attractive conditions for self-employ-
ment like those in metropolitan areas do not necessarily arise, and active repre-
sentatives of the population of these cities who strive for self-employment — not 
out of a need for physical survival, but with a view to achieving a high standard of 
living — migrate to metropolitan areas. This is supported by the smaller proportion 
of the self-employed (8%), which is half the size as in other categories. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the estimates of the share of concealed income based on 
the various household income groups formed in relation to the median household 
income in the sample. 
7KHUHVXOWV VXSSRUW +\SRWKHVLV  in the lower and upper income groups, 
the proportion of concealed income is higher than in the middle+RZHYHU LW
turns out that the poorest households hide nearly 1.5 times more income than in 
WKHVXEVDPSOHRIWKHPRVWDIÀXHQWKRXVHKROGVZKHUHDVWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIVHOI
employed households is the same for all three subsamples. The number of obser-
YDWLRQVLQWKHVXEVDPSOHVLVVXI¿FLHQWO\ODUJH!VRLWLVXQOLNHO\WKDWWKHUH
are any technical reasons to consider the estimates inadequate. Rather, we are 
dealing here with essentially economic mechanisms. A lack of jobs and the need 
Fig. 4. Interval estimates of the proportion of concealed income based on (a) the administrative status of 
the locality where the household resides and (b) the size of the settlement (in millions).
Fig. 5. Interval estimate of the proportion of concealed income per household income group relative to 
the median household income in the RLMS sample (med = RUB 27,160).
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WRFRPSHQVDWHIRUWKHFRVWVRILQÀDWLRQZKLFKDUHPXFKKLJKHUIRUSRRUKRXVH-
holds than for the wealthy (Ershov, Matitsin, 2012), force poor households to 
KLGHPRUHRIWKHLULQFRPHWKDQRWKHUKRXVHKROGFDWHJRULHVHYHQWKHDIÀXHQW
7. Conclusion
In this study, an attempt was made to estimate the proportion of income con-
cealed by Russian households based on RLMS data for 2012. As a theoretical 
framework for the study, we used a model proposed in Pissarides and Weber 
7KLVPRGHOGHVFULEHV WKHEHKDYLRURIFRQVXPHUKRXVHKROGVDFFRXQWLQJ
for concealed income on the one hand and the relationship between income and 
consumption on the other. The model assumptions that food consumption by 
self-employed households exceeds similar consumption by others and that food 
expenditures are reported correctly are inconsistent for Russian households in 
WKHVDPSOH+RZHYHUWKHFRVWRIFORWKLQJLVDQH[SHQGLWXUHFDWHJRU\IRUFXUUHQW
consumer goods that can help evaluate the proportion of concealed income. 
Because revenues are measured with errors and because external shocks simul-
taneously affect income and expenses, income constitutes an endogenous regres-
sor that requires instrumentation. Strong and exogenous instruments for income 
in the clothing expenditure equation are indicators of the presence of expensive 
durable goods and foreign-made cars in a given household. The resulting set of 
LQVWUXPHQWVLVUDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKHVHWXVHGLQ3LVVDULGHVDQG:HEHU
For economical and adequate accounting of the heterogeneity of expenditures 
in various income and settlement groups, we used a multilevel (hierarchical) sim-
ulation technique not previously used in similar studies. (We introduced random 
JURXSHIIHFWVLQWRWKHPRGHORQWKHFRQVWDQWDQGDFRHI¿FLHQWZLWKDYDULDEOHLQ-
dicating whether the household is self-employed).
,Q WKHLUIXQGDPHQWDO VWXG\ 3LVVDULGHV DQG:HEHU  ZHUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ
a comparative analysis of the share of concealed income between white-collar 
and blue-collar households. In this study, it appeared more relevant to analyze 
the change in the share of concealed income by income and settlement groups of 
households, formed in relation to the median household income across the entire 
sample and based on the size and administrative status of the settlement. We for-
mulated three research hypotheses regarding the behavior trends of the propor-
tion of concealed income depending on income, the size of the locality, and its 
administrative status. The resulting estimates do not contradict the hypotheses that 
WKHSURSRUWLRQRILQFRPHFRQFHDOHGLQWKHH[WUHPHFDWHJRULHV³SRRU´DQG³ULFK´
KRXVHKROGVKRXVHKROGVLQUXUDODUHDVDQGUHJLRQDOFHQWHUVDUHKLJKHUWKDQDYHU-
DJH+RZHYHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWUHYHQXHVZLOOPRUHRIWHQEHFRQFHDOHGLQVPDOO
VHWWOHPHQWVZDVQRWFRQ¿UPHGDV WKHVL]HRIVHWWOHPHQWV LQFUHDVHV WRPLOOLRQ
people, the share of concealed income grows gradually to 10% of the total house-
KROGLQFRPHLQPLOOLRQSOXVFLWLHVLWVXGGHQO\IDOOVEHORZDQGIRUPHWURSROL-
WDQDUHDVLWULVHVDJDLQDQGUHDFKHVDKLJKSRLQWDW
The estimated concealed incomes based on the RLMS sample, and extrapo-
lated to the general population, were comparable to estimates by other experts 
and researchers. Averaging the results obtained by extrapolation produces esti-
mates of the lower and upper limits of the share of concealed income at 16% and 
UHVSHFWLYHO\7KHVHUHVXOWVIDOOZLWKLQWKHLQWHUYDORIHVWLPDWHVRIWKHVFDOH
81<D0XUDVKRY75DWQLNRYD5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
of the shadow economy in Russia conducted in 2011 by Rosstat based on SNA 
 DQG WKH¿QGLQJV RI LQGLYLGXDO H[SHUWV ± IRU WKHVDPH SHULRG
KRZHYHU WKH\DUHKDOIDVKLJKDV WKH:RUOG%DQN¶VHVWLPDWHV IRU 
The differences may be explained by the fact that this study does not take into 
account the contribution of the criminal element to the shadow economy.
This paper has developed an approach to assessing the share of household in-
come excluded from statistical observations, and it shows that, drawing on the re-
sults, we can get an idea of the size of the shadow economy in Russia, both in 
general and with respect to certain social groups. The estimate associated with 
FHUWDLQJURXSVFDQEHHVSHFLDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWEHFDXVHZKHQDQDO\]LQJWKHHIIHFWV
of pricing and tax policies, it could prove useful to understanding which types 
of households are more likely to escape into the shadow. Such assessments can 
clarify the extent to which escaping to the shadow will mitigate the excesses of 
HFRQRPLFSROLFLHVIRUGLIIHUHQWSRSXODWLRQJURXSVDQGZLOOWKXVVHUYHDVD³VRFLDO
VKRFNDEVRUEHU´,WFDQDOVRLOOXPLQDWHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHVKDGRZHFRQRP\
may also do harm to the pension system.
This approach may be more broadly used, as household income indicators are 
applied to estimate the well-being of different social strata within the population 
DQGWKHGHJUHHRIVWUDWL¿FDWLRQDPRQJWKHP$OVRLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRXQGHUVWDQG
how accounting for income measurement errors can change the view of the situa-
tion and affect the mechanisms for providing targeted social support.
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Appendix A
Table A1
'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVIRUWKHVRFLRGHPRJUDSKLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIKRXVHKROGPHPEHUV
9DULDEOH Entire 
sample
No income 
IURPVH
Share of 
revenue 
IURPVH
< 20%
Share of 
revenue 
IURPVH

Married members of the household 52.80  52.54 48.28
+RXVHKROGPHPEHUVHQJDJHGLQVNLOOHGODERU 45.80  42.12 
Males heading households engaged in skilled labor    
+RXVHKROGPHPEHUVZLWKVHFRQGDU\YRFDWLRQDOHGXFDWLRQ 41.76   
Members of households with higher education    
&KLOGUHQLQWKHKRXVHKROG    87.42
+RXVHKROGPHPEHUVVWDWLQJWKDWWKH\DUHIXOO\VDWLV¿HG
with their life
15.51  15.15 17.10
+RXVHKROGPHPEHUVZLVKLQJWR¿QGDQRWKHUMRE    
Any member of the household with an additional job 4.24 4.60  
7KHKRXVHKROG¶VDELOLW\WRLPSURYHLWVOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQV 11.05   
7KHKRXVHKROG¶VDELOLW\WRVSHQGDKROLGD\ZLWKDOORI
the family members
20.57 22.68 17.72 18.28
+RXVHKROGDELOLW\WRSD\IRUWKHXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWLRQRI
its members
  16.74 
School children  28.5  
Any member of the household receiving higher education 16.8 17.1 14.7 
+RXVHKROGVL]HQXPEHURISHUVRQV²PHGLDQ 2 2 2 
+RXVHKROGVL]HQXPEHURISHUVRQV²DYHUDJH 2.71   2.87
Number of children in the household — median 2 2 2 2
Number of children per household — average 1.70 1.64 1.77 1.76
Table A2
/LVWRIVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWH[SODQDWRU\DQGLQVWUXPHQWDOYDULDEOHVIRUUHJUHVVLRQPRGHOVRIH[SHQGLWXUHV
VWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWDWWKHOHYHORIVLJQL¿FDQFH
List of regressors (Z ) List of tools (X )
The number of members in the household, number of children
Ability to pay for the education of the children
The presence of a rented housing, Size of living space
&URSVKDUYHVWHGIURPWKHODQG
:DVKLQJPDFKLQHFHOOSKRQHGLJLWDOFDPHUD'9'
computer, laptop, bicycle 
The size of the settlement (for models by type groups) 
The presence of foreign cars, dishwasher, 
KLJKVSHHGLQWHUQHWSODVPD79
alternative housing,
The opportunity to spend holidays with 
the whole family
+HDGRIKRXVHKROGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ
the economically active population
<D0XUDVKRY75DWQLNRYD5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
Table A3
'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVRIKRXVHKROGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQJHQHUDO
9DULDEOH Entire  
sample
No income 
IURPVH
Share of  
revenue from  
VH
Share of 
revenue from 
VH
Place of residence
9LOODJH 24.0 21.2 24.8 
Urban-type settlement 5.6  5.2 
&LW\  27.4 27.7 18.7
5HJLRQDO&HQWHU 44.1 45.4  42.8
Possession of real estate and housing facilities
Residence in partial ownership    
+RXVLQJLVQRWLQSULYDWHRZQHUVKLS 6.0 5.4  5.7
Total area (sq.m.)   54.0 57.1
Living area (sq.m.)    
Number of rooms    2.4
&HQWUDOKHDWLQJ 71.7 74.6 70.4 
&HQWUDOZDWHUVXSSO\V\VWHP 87.8 88.7 87.0 85.6
+RWZDWHUVXSSO\ 66.2 68.5 65.4 58.7
Sewer  76.8  
Phone    
Gas supply 66.0  65.5 60.0
Possession of a country house  22.6 21.6 
Possession of another apartment 8.5 8.6  
Possession of land 
Ownership of land 50.1  52.2 
Land lease    
&URSVKDUYHVWHGIURPWKHODQG 44.8  47.7 44.2
Sale of harvested crops 2.1 1.1 2.2 5.7
Possession of technical equipment
Possession of a domestically-produced car 22.0 21.4  21.6
Possession of a foreign car 20.7   17.6
Possession of a truck   2.0 
Possession of a motorcycle    
Possession of a bicycle 21.2 20.1  
Possession of a tractor 2.4 2.1  
Possession of a lawn mower 7.5 8.0 7.5 5.2
Possession of a computer and internet access
Possession of a computer 42.1 44.6  
Possession of a laptop   28.1 
Low-speed internet access 18.1 18.8  
Broadband internet access    
Possession of other durable goods
Possession of electric oven  24.2 21.5 
Possession of a refrigerator   46.8 48.0
Possession of a freezer  12.4 11.1 11.5
Possession of a washing machine   68.6 
Possession of a microwave oven 61.2   58.5
Possession of a dishwasher 2.7   
3RVVHVVLRQRIDFRORU79 78.5  81.2 75.7
3RVVHVVLRQRIDSODVPD79  44.7 40.2 
Possession of a player 24.7   
3RVVHVVLRQRID'9'SOD\HU 45.5 45.1  
Possession of a digital camera    
Possession of camcorder 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.4
3RVVHVVLRQRIDQ03SOD\HU 10.4 11.1 8.8 11.0
Possession of a GPS navigator 7.2 8.1 6.1 6.5
Possession of an air conditioner 8.2 8.1 8.2 
Possession of a satellite antenna 17.0 15.5 17.4 
3RVVHVVLRQRIFDEOH79    25.1
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Table A4
Interval estimate of the proportion of concealed income, depending on the size of the locality.
Model  Less than 
100,000 
people
From 
100,001 to 
400,000 
people
From 
400,001 to 
1,000,000 
people
From 
1,000,000 to 
10,000,000 
people
More than 
10 million 
people
The sample size   700  
Number of self-employed   118 42 
Percentage of self-employed 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.16
Average total income (RUB)    44 772.72 
Average total income of 
self-employed (RUB)
    
Average total income of 
others (RUB)
    
Grade k 1.16 1.40 1.42  
Lower limit of estimate k 1.11   1.26 1.47
Upper limit of estimation k 1.21 1.46   
Average proportion of 
concealed income 
 0.06   0.11
Lower limit of the proportion of 
concealed income 
0.02 0.05 0.07  0.10
Upper limit of the proportion of 
concealed income 
0.04 0.07 0.10 0.04 
Table A5
Interval estimate of the proportion of concealed income, depending on the administrative status of the locality.
Model 9LOODJH Urban-type 
settlement
&LW\ Regional  
center
The sample size   1,146 
Number of self-employed 215  121 
Percentage of self-employed 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.15
Average total income (RUB)    
Average total income of the self-employed (RUB)    
Average total income of others (RUB)    48 276.05
Grade k 1.17 1.20  1.51
Lower limit of estimate k 1.11  1.12 1.42
Upper limit of estimation k 1.24 1.27 1.26 
Average proportion of concealed income 0.04  0.02 
Lower limit of the proportion of concealed income  0.02 0.01 0.08
Upper limit of the proportion of concealed income 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.11
Table A6
Interval estimate of the proportion of concealed income depending on the income group.
Model Median income
< 0.5 0.5—1.5 > 1.5 
The sample size 670  
Number of self-employed   221
Percentage of self-employed 0.16 0.15 0.16
Average total income (RUB)   
Average total income of the self-employed (RUB)   
Average total income of others (RUB)   
Grade k 1.70 1.12 
Lower limit of estimate k 1.61 1.06 
Upper limit of estimation k 1.80  1.47
Average proportion of concealed income 0.11 0.02 0.08
Lower limit of the proportion of concealed income 0.10 0.01 0.06
Upper limit of the proportion of concealed income   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